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1. THE LEVEL OF UN	FRIENDLY ACTIVITY I	N THE PAKEE	O ALLY AREA	
10 INE LEVEL OF OR	LUTE MOLTATIE T	WINE PARSE	ETT MEN,	
WHICH HAS PRODUCED THE	RECENT SERIES OF T	RAGIC MISHAPS	3 TO	
AIRCRAFT, (BOTH AIRPLA	NES AND ROTORCRAFT)	, AND PERSON	icl, Represen	TS
AN UNUSUALLY HIGH DEGRI	EE OF RISK. IT IS	RECOGNIZED TI	IAT THE TACTI	CAL
SITUATION IS EXTREMEL	Y FLUID, WITH FRIEN	DLY AND ENEMY	FORCES IN	
CLOSE CONTACT IN CONFI				
LINES, AND THAT THE QU	ANTITY AND SOPHISTI	CATION OF ENE	MY ANTI-	
AIRCEAFT ARMAMENT IS R	FLATTUFLY HIGH COME	ARED TO MOST	OTHER	A.
WINCHULL MEMBERS IN IN	PRMITAPPI WIGH OAN	ARED TO HOUT	OT ILEM	
LOCATIONS IN LAOS. TH	E OPERATING PATTERN	IS, IN THE	IAIN, ONE	
AP AP TEINIVEAD APC TH	ENGLANES (COMETIME	C CUITETING A	NO DENTRO	
OF FRIENDLY FORCES IN	ENCLAVES, COURTINE	2 SUTLITING W	ID DEVIND	· .
ENEMY LINES), CLOSELY	SURROUNDED BY ENEMY	FORCES WITH		
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AIRPLANES DELIVERING S	UPPLIES TO AND	HELICOPTE	.KS	
EVACUATING WOUNDED OR	OTHER PERSONNEL FRO	M AND DELIVER	RING	
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PERSONNEL TO THESE ENC	LAVES. THE DIFFICU	LTIES AND CO	NF USIONS	. :
WHICH EXIST RESULT IN	INADEQUATE SITUATIO	N INTELLIGEN	CE	
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AND THIS ALONG WITH IN	ADEQUATE TACTICAL A	IR SUPPORT H	AS	
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CREATED AN UNUSUALLY HIGH RISK ENVIORNMENT OVER WHICH WE ARE
QUITE CONCERNED, NOT ONLY FOR THE SAFETY OF PERSONNEL AND AIRCRAFT
BUT ALSO ABOUT A GROWING LIST OF PILOT RESIGNATIONS AND WORRIED
FEELINGS AMONG THE AIRCREW COMPLEMENT ABOUT THE HIGH RISK BEING
FACED.

- 2. SEVERAL STEPS HAVE BEEN TAKEN DURING THE PAST FEW DAYS
  TOWARDS IMPROVING THE SITUATION. THEY HAVE HELPED SOMEWHAT
  BUT CERTAINLY NOT CURED THE INTELLIGENCE DEFICIENCIES BUT HAVE
  SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED THE RISK TO AIRPLANES. THE PROBLEMS
  CONTINUE LITTLE ABATED FOR ROTOR CRAFT.
- 3. REGARDING INTELLIGENCE AND REFLECTING THE NEED FOR INCREASED ACCURACY OF TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE REGARDING DISPOSITION AND ARMAMENT OF ENEMY FORCES, THE CONTRACTOR HAS POSITIONED AN OPERATIONS SPECIALIST (ALONG WITH A PORTAKAMP FIC) AT LII TO SCREEN AND CORRELATE SUCH INFORMATION FOR ITS IMPACT ON AIR OPERATIONS, AND TO CONDUCT BRIEFINGS FOR ALL AIRCREWS.
- 4. REGARDING AIRCRAFT, THE SITUATION IN THE AREA AROUND LIID DIFFERS MATERIALLY FOR AIRPLANES AND ROTORCRAFT. AIRPLANE EFFORT IN THE HIGH RISK AREAS HAS BEEN RESTRICTED FOR SOME TIME TO RESUPPLY BY AIRDROP. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ENEMY ANTI-AIRCRAFT

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FIRE HAS CONTINUED TO INCREASE. AERIAL DELIVERY TECHNIQUES,
HOWEVER, HAVE CHANGED IN RESPONSE, FIRST WITH THE INTRODUCTION OF
IMPACT CHUTES TO INCREASE ACCURACY FROM HIGHER ALTITUDES, FOLLOWED
BY A SWITCH TO NYLON CHUTES WITH LOW ALTITUDE (300 - 400 AGL)
DELIVERY AS SIZE OF DZ'S DIMINISHED AND PROXIMITY AND FREQUENCY
OF 37MM AA FIRE INCREASED. FINALLY, AFTER THE LOSS OF C7A 61-2401
ON 23 NOV, LIMITED OFFENSIVE TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT WAS AFFORDED
TO FIXED WING AIRCRAFT IN HIGH THREAT ZONES. THE FLIGHT CREWS
REDOUBLED THEIR EFFORT TO MINIMIZE EXPOSURE BY VARYING DROP PATTERNS,
RAPID DESCENTS AND PULL-UPS INTO/FROM DZ'S, AND USE OF "POP-UP"
DELIVERY FROM TREE-TOP LEVEL. IN THE LATEST INCIDENT (C123K)
54-648 ON 6 DEC). EVEN THESE PRECAUTIONS WERE NOT ADEQUATE,
SINCE THE AIRCRAFT, FLYING WITH T28 TACTICAL AIR COVER, WAS HIT
ON THE FIRST PASS, MADE FROM A "POP-UP" DELIVERY.

5. RECOGNIZING THE URGENCY OF THE TACTICAL GROUND SITUATION,
THE REQUIREMENT FOR CONTINUED AIR SUPPORT, AND THE NECESSITY TO
ARREST LOSSES, FIXED WING AIR RESUPPLY TACTICS HAVE BEEN CHANGED
AGAIN. TRIAL RUNS AT NIGHT WERE CONDUCTED STARTING 7 DEC USING
DHCS AIRCRAFT EQUIPPED WITH LORAN-C. THESE PROVED SATISFACTORY,
AND DAYLIGHT DELIVERY TO HIGH THREAT DZ'S IN THE L11 AREA HAS BEEN

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THE CAPACITY OF THE DHC6 WAS INSUFFICIENT TO MEET DEMANDS AND C7A'S WERE INSERTED INTO THE PROGRAM. ALL DHC6'S AND C7A'S IN THE FLEET ARE EQUIPPED WITH LORAN C PROVISIONS. SEVEN LORAN C'S ARE AVAILABLE PRESENTLY. SWITCHING BLACK BOXES FROM ONE TO ANOTHER AIRCRAFT IS READILY ACCOMPLISHED BY AN ORDINARY TECHNICIAN WHO HAS BEEN TRAINED ON THIS TASK. INSTALLATIONS OF LORAN PROVISIONS IN MOST AIRCRAFT TAKE SAY SIX HOURS. THE DHC6 AIRCREWS WERE WELL TRAINED AND EXPERIENCED IN THE USE OF LORAN C IN NIGHT WORK. C7A AIRCREWS REQUIRED TRAINING WHICH INVOLVED, FOR MINIMUM QUALIFICATIONS, SOME THREE TO FOUR HOURS OF AIRWORK. SINCE THE INAUGURATION OF NIGHT DROPPING HUNDREDS OF NIGHT DROP MISSIONS, (WITH AN AVERAGE OF SOME THREE DZ'S PER FLIGHT), DHC6 AND C7A AIRPLANES HAVE BEEN COMPLETED SUCCESSFULLY AND WITHOUT INCIDENT OR GUNFIRE DAMAGE. THE EFFICIENCY OF THIS SYSTEM OF NIGHT RESUPPLY OF DZ'S SEEMS PROVEN FOR THE TIME BEING. SHOULD STILL GREATER CAPACITY BE REQUIRED, C123K'S CAN BE INSTALLED WITH LORAN C PROVISIONS AND AIRCREWS TRAINED IN ITS USE ON THESE MISSIONS. WITH THE USE OF LARGER AIRCRAFT THAN THE DHC6 AND AIRCREWS NOT SO WELL EXPERIENCED, SOME DEGRADATION OF DROP ACCURACY OVER THAT OF DAYLIGHT DROPS, OR NIGHT DROPS BY DHCG, MAY BE EXPERIENCED,

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(TO DATE, HOWEVER, ACCURACY IS REPORTED TO BE EXCELLENT),
ALSO, GROUND FORCES, GENERALLY, ARE NOT TRAINED, EQUIPPED OR
EXPERIENCED FOR NIGHT RECOVERY. BUT, THE BENEFITS OF THIS SYSTEM
WOULD SEEM TO FAR OUTWEIGH THE DISADVANTAGES. SAFETY OF OPERATIONS
PROSPECTS SEEM GOOD GIVEN THE NAVIGATION PRECISION OF LORAN C
AND THE FREEDOM. SO FAR. FROM GUNFIRE DAMAGE.

IN THE LII SITUATION SEEMS PRACTICAL AT THIS TIME; HOWEVER, ENEMY INTRODUCTION OF RADAR AIMED ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS, MISSILES,

NOS OR OTHER COUNTERMEASURES WOULD NULLIFY THIS TACTIC AS WELL.

IT SHOULD ALSO BE UNDERSTOOD THAT GENERALLY THE TERRAIN IN THE AREA OF ACTIVITY PRESENTS RELATIVELY FEW NATURAL HAZARDS COMPARED TO ELSEWHERE IN LAOS. IN THE EVENT THAT CONDITIONS OR THE OPERATING LOCATIONS CHANGE WHICH ALTER THE PRESENT NIGHT DROP EFFECTIVE—

NESS, IT MAY BE NECESSARY TO INVESTIGATE THE USE OF SOPHISTICATED DELIVERY PARACHUTES (SUCH AS THE ROGALLO WING, ELECTRONICALLY GUIDED DEVICE). IT IS UNCERTAIN IF THESE CHUTES COULD BE RECOVERED FOR RE-USE, (IT IS UNDERSTOOD THEY ARE SOMEWHAT COSTLY); NOR IS AVAILABILITY KNOWN. HQS IS REQUESTED TO COMMENT ON THE PRACTICALITY OF USING THIS OR ANOTHER TYPE PARACHUTE IN THE LONG TIENG

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ENVIRONMENT. FOR EXAMPLE.

7. ROTOR CRAFT MISSIONS HAVE BEEN SUBJECTED TO THE SAME BUILD-UP IN ANTI-AIR CRAFT ACTIVITY. BUT THEY HAVE LIMITED OPPORTUNITY FOR CHANGING TACTICS. TREE-TOP LEVEL PENETRATION AND DEPARTURE FROM "HOT" HLZ'S VIRTUALLY ELIMINATES THE 37MM RISK. BUT THE RESULTANT EXPOSURE TO SMALL ARMS AND 12.7MM FIRE HAS PROVEN VERY COSTLY. BOTH DURING APPROACH AND DEPARTURE HELICOPTERS ARE EXTREMELY VULNERABLE TO GROUND FIRE BECAUSE THEY ARE AT SUCH SLOW SPEED. AND ARE BELOW SAFE AUTO ROTATION ALTITUDE IF SYSTEMS DAMAGE IS INCURRED. EVEN IF ENTRY/EXIT TO THE HLZ IS MADE AT HIGH ALTITUDE. THE HELICOPTER MUST SPEND A VERY CONSIDERABLE TIME IN THE SLOW SPEED/LOW ALTITUDE HIGH VULNERABILITY PHASE. MECESSITY FOR ENSURING THAT AN APPROACH/DEPARTURE ZONE IS RELATIVELY FREE FROM OPPOSING TROOPS IS PARAMOUNT. UNFORTUNATELY, UNITS WHICH NEED HELICOPTER MEDEVAC OF WOUNDED OR INSERTION OF FRESH TROOPS OFTEN ARE IN CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY VERY NEAR THEIR PERIMETER DEFENSES. THE PARADOX OF THIS CIRCUMSTANCE HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED FROM AN EARLY DATE IN THE LII AREA AND THE CUSTOMER HAS CONSCIENTIOUSLY ATTEMPTED TO SUPPLY TACTICAL CLOSE AIR SUPPORT FOR SUCH MISSIONS. THIS HAS BEEN IN THE FORM OF ARMED UHIC

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HELICOPTERS OR FI	XED WING TACTICAL AIR, OR	BOTH. RECENTLY,
HOWEVER. THE LOSS OF	A1E/H SUPPORT AND THE	T DIVERSION OF
nowavang rna 2000 or		
VIRTUALLY ALL "FAST MOVE	AIRCRAFT TO VIE	T NAM HAS
SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED TH	E EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CL	OSE AIR SUPPORT TO
CRITICAL HELICOPTER MISS	IONS. BOTH THE	ELEMENT AND THE
T28 AIRCRAFT PRESENT CON	TINUING COMMUNICATIONS/CO	OORD INATION
DIFFICIATIFC ABICING FRO	M I ANGUAGE DADDIEDG ADD	TTIOMALLY THE
DIFFICULITES ARISING FRO	M LANGUAGE BARRIERS. ADD	TITOWALLY, THE
GROUP HAS	SUFFERED FROM A PARTS SHO	ORTAGE WITH AS
MANY AS FOUR OUT OF SIX	MACHINES BEING GROUNDED I	N RECENT TIMES
		IN NEODWE I I III D
FOR PARTS. LASTLY, AND	POSSIBLY MOST CRITICALLY,	, THE UHIC AIR-
CRAFT ARE BADLY "OUTGUNN	ED" BY THE ENEMY 12.7 WEA	APON. WITH THE T28'S
REPRESENTING A STAND-OFF	AT BEST WHEN AGAINST A S	SKILLED AND DETERMINED
12.7 CREW.		
a the evapor taken t	MDA OT ON TOOOD MODALE AGE	ITELIED DV DADID
8. THE EXCEPTIONAL I	MPACT ON TROOP MORALE ACH	TIEVED BY KAPID
MEDEVAC OF WOUNDED, OR I	NSERTION OF CRITICALLY NE	EDED FRESH TROOPS,
TO UEDY OF EAD AND A CHAN	GE TO NIGHT OPERATION OF	COTTICAL HELICOPTED
15 VERT CLEAR AND A CRAN	GE TO WIGHT OFERHION OF	CATITORE RELICOPTER
MISSIONS IS NOW UNDER AC	TIVE CONSIDERATION. THE	OPERATIONAL .
RISKS OF NIGHT HELICOPTE	R OPERATION ARE CONSIDERA	BLY GREATER THAN
THOSE FOR FIXED WING AIR	CRAFT, HOWEVER, IN ADDITE	ION TO THE PROBLEM

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OF NAVIGATING TO A SMALL HLZ AT NIGHT, (WHICH WE PROPOSE TO SOLVE BY

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INSTALLING LORAN-C PROVISIONS), THE HELICOPTER MUST MAKE A BLACK-OUT APPROACH SINCE NORMAL USE OF LANDING FLOOD LIGHTS WOULD LIKELY ATTRACT NEARLY THE SAME VOLUME OF GROUND FIRE AT A SMALL PERIMETER HLZ AS IN THE DAYTIME. LANDING LIGHT USE MUST BE CONFINED TO THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE TIME. WITH ANY MOONLIGHT, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NIGHTTIME COVER IS ALSO LESSENED. ALSO, THE NOISE LEVEL OF CERTAIN HELICOPTER TYPES IS SO DISTINCTIVE THAT IT WILL ALERT ENEMY TROOPS AT NIGHT AND PROVIDE DIFINITIVE LOCATION INFORMATION. THE HIGH EXPOSURE FACTOR ATTENDANT WITH LANDING/TAKE OFF AT HLZ'S SUBJECT TO ENEMY FIRE NECESSITATES THAT A BACK-UP OR SAR HELICOPTER ACCOMPANY EACH MISSION. THIS REQUIRES NIGHT FORMATION FLIGHT. IN WHICH OUR CREWS ARE INEXPERIENCED, AND INVOLVES QUESTIONABLE SAFETY IN WEATHER AT NIGHT IN HELICOPTERS. USE OF SINGLE ENGINE HELICOPTERS AT NIGHT MAY BE OF QUESTIONABLE SOUNDNESS SINCE SUCCESSFUL ACCOMPLISHMENT OF AN AUTOROTATION IN THE EVENT OF MECHANICAL FAILURE IS UNLIKELY CONSIDERING THE TERRAIN OVER WHICH OPERATION WOULD BE CONDUCTED. AND THE HIGH DESCENT RATES GENERATED IN AUTOROTATIONS. IN SHORT. FOR HELICOPTERS, NIGHT OPERATION OFFERS SOME REDUCTION OF POTENTIAL EXPOSURE TO ENEMY FIRE. BUT NOT TO THE EXTENT IT DOES FOR FIXED WING AIR DROP OPERATIONS, MEANWHILE IMPOSING

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NOTW IT HST AND ING THE SE DI	RAWBACKS, THE CO	NTRACTOR P	LANS TO	COND UCT	
EVALUATION NIGHT FLIGHT	S. HSING SPECIAL	LY TRAINED	CREWS A	ND LORAN C.	
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9. AS ALSO NOTED IN	REPERENCE TO FI	XED WING O	PER AT ION	5 IN	
PARA 4 ABOVE, THE SUCCE	SS OF THE ATTEMP	T TO CONTI	NUE PROV	ISION	
OF VITAL HELICOPTER AIR	SUPPORT IS CONT	INGENT UPO	N NO FUR	THER	
DETERIORATION OF THE TA	CIICAL ENVIRONME	NI. FUR H	ELICOPIE	(S,	
THIS MEANS THAT ENEMY TO	ROOP CONCENTRATI	ONS IN CLO	SE PROXI	1ITY TO	
HLZ 'S WILL SEVERELY RES	TRICT THE CHANCE	S FOR SUCC	ESS, EVE	N AT	
NIGHT. OPERATIONS WHICH	U MAY BE CAMBITOT	ED CAFFIV	AT NIGUT	T AI	
		•			
RELATIVELY LEVEL TERRAI	N, (SUCH AS THE	LS44 VALLE	Y), PROB	ABLY ARE	
UNWORKABLE IN THE MOUNT	ANEOUS AREAS NEA	R LS20A.	THOSE LAT	TER LOCATI	ONS

IN. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT IN THE EVENT THE TACTICAL SITUATION CHANGES IN THE LS20A REGION, NECESSITATING AIR SUPPORT UNDER CONDITIONS OF HEAVY ENEMY AA FIRE, CONVERSION TO NIGHT OPERATIONS MAY NOT BE A VIABLE CONCEPT, EXCEPT FOR FIXED WING RESUPPLY OF VERY LARGE SITES SUCH AS HAS BEEN DONE AT LS32. IT VERY LIKELY WILL NOT

ALSO HAVE GENERALLY BEEN CHARACTERIZED BY THE VERY SMALL DIAMETER

PERIMETER DEFENSES FURTHER MITIGATING THE VALUE OF DARKNESS.

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BE SOUND FOR HELICOPTER MEDEVAC OR TROOP MOVEMENT.

- THREAT AREAS MAY BE NECESSARY. WE, THEREFORE, REQUEST THAT SERIOUS CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO UPGRADING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF TACTICAL CLOSE AIR SUPPORT PROVIDED FOR OUR FLIGHTS INTO SUCH AREAS.

  CAREFULLY TIMED PREMISSION STRIKES WITH HARD ORDINANCE, TOGETHER WITH COVER BY BOTH "FAST MOVERS" TO OFFSET HEAVY CALIBER WEAPONS AND ARMED HELICOPTERS OR OVIØ AIRCRAFT TO COPE WITH SMALL ARMS FIRE, WE FEEL WOULD BE EFFECTIVE IN REDUCING THE RISK. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT EFFECTIVE ENGLISH LANGUAGE COMMUNICATIONS BE MAINTAINED WITH THESE COVER ELEMENTS.
- 12. ANY SUGGESTIONS, COMMENTS OR ASSISTANCE IN THIS SITUATION ARE WELCOME. WE ARE ANXIOUS TO ACCOMPLISH THE SUPPORT MISSION SAFELY, WHICH WE FEEL WILL PRODUCE THE BEST LONG TERM RESULTS, AND EARNESTLY SEEK HELP IN ACHIEVING THIS GOAL, PARTICULARLY IN THE AREA OF IMPROVED TACTICAL AIR COVER. E2 IMPDET.

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